How to achieve differential privacy in the distributed setting, where the dataset is distributed among the distrustful parties, is an important problem. We consider in what condition can a protocol inherit the differential privacy property of a function it computes. The heart of the problem is the secure multiparty computation of randomized function. A notion obliviousness is introduced, which captures the key security problems when computing a randomized function from a deterministic one in the distributed setting. By this observation, a sufficient and necessary condition about securely computing a randomized function from a deterministic one is given. The above result can not only be used to determine whether a protocol computing differentially private function is secure, but also be used to construct a secure one. Then we prove that the differential privacy property of a function can be inherited by the protocol computing it if the protocol securely computes it. A composition theorem of differentially private protocols is also presented. Finally, we construct protocols of Gaussian mechanism and Laplace mechanism, which inherit the differential privacy property.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, a lot of personal information are collected and stored in many databases. Each database is owned by a particular autonomous entity, e.g., financial data by banks, medical data by hospitals, online shopping data by e-commerce companies, online searching records by search engine companies, income data by tax agencies. Someone may be interested to mine useful information among these databases. For example, insurance companies may want to analyze the insurance risk of some group by mining both the bank's database and the hospital's database, or several banks may want to aggregate their databases to estimate the loan risk in some area, or, more generally, one may want to learn a classifier among these private databases [1] . However, due to privacy consideration, data integrating or data mining among these databases should be conducted in a privacy-preserving way: First, one must perform computations on databases that must be kept private and no single entity is allowed to see all of the databases on which the analysis is running; Second, it is not previously clear whether the analysis results contain sensitive information traceable back to particular individuals [2] , [3] . The first privacy problem is the research field of secure MultiParty Computation (MPC) [4] . However, since standard MPC does not analyze and prevent what is (implicitly) leaked by the analysis results [5] , [6] , the second privacy problem can not be treated by MPC. Fortunately, the second privacy problem could be analyzed by differential privacy (DP) [7] , [8] , which is a mathematically rigorous privacy model that has recently received a significant amount of research attention for its robustness to known attacks, such as those involving side information [2] , [3] . Therefore, solving the above privacy problems needs the combination of MPC and DP.
There is a misunderstanding that the above problem can easily be solved without using MPC, such as in the local model [7] : Each party first locally computes and perturbs the local query result using an appropriate i -differentially private algorithm and then outputs it; These local query results are then synthesized to a final result, which would satisfydifferential privacy by the composition property of differential privacy, where = i i . However, the above method will either add more noise to the final result, such as in the noise mechanism [8] , or need redesign of the related algorithm, such as in the exponential mechanism [9] , which would be a more hard work.
We now present the considered problem in a more formal way. Let a dataset x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) be distributed among the mutually distrustful parties P 1 , . . . , P n , where x i is owned by P i . The above dataset assignment is referred to as the distributed setting. The parties implement differentially private analyses in the distributed setting by the following way: First choose what to compute, i.e., a differentially private function M(x); Then decide how to compute it, i.e., construct an MPC protocol to compute M(x). In the paper we only treat the second step. That is, we assume that there has been a differentially private algorithm M(x) in the client-server setting. Our task is to construct an MPC protocol π to compute M(x) in the distributed setting. Of course, it is vital that π should 'inherit' the differential privacy property of M(x). That is, in executing π, each party's view (or each subgroup of the parties' views) should be differentially private to other parties' private data. However, constructing such protocol is challenging. To see that, we consider two examples appeared in the related works to construct differentially private protocols. Example 1 (Gaussian mechanism). The party P i has the math score list x i of Class i for i = 1, 2. P 1 , P 2 are willing to count the total number of the students whose score ≥ 60 in x 1 and x 2 , while letting the score list one party owns be secret to the other and letting the output f (x 1 , x 2 ) satisfy differential privacy, where f is the counting function. We use Gaussian mechanism to achieve differential privacy, i.e., adding Gaussian noise to f (x 1 , x 2 ). Note that the sensitivity of f is Δ 2 f = 1. By Definition 3 in Section II-B, they can add a random number r drawn from N (0, σ 2 ) to achieve ( , δ)differential privacy, where σ > 2 ln 1.25/δ/ . There are two intuitive protocols to achieve the task: 1) Each P i generates a random number r i drawn from N (0, σ 2 /2) and computes o i = f (x i )+r i locally. P 1 , P 2 then compute o 1 +o 2 using an MPC protocol and output the result o.
is drawn from N (0, σ 2 ) due to the infinitely divisibility of Gaussian distribution [10] . 2) Each P i generates a random number r i drawn from N (0, σ 2 ) locally. P 1 , P 2 then compute and output o = f (x 1 ) + f (x 2 ) + LT(r 1 , r 2 ) using an MPC protocol, where LT(r 1 , r 2 ) outputs the smaller one in r 1 , r 2 .
Intuitively, both of the two protocols in Example 1 satisfy ( , δ)-DP since both of them add noises drawn from N (0, σ 2 ) to f (x 1 , x 2 ). However, to the first protocol, if P 1 computes o − r 1 it obtains the value of f (x 1 , x 2 )+r 2 . Since r 2 is drawn from N (0, σ 2 /2) but not N (0, σ 2 ), P 1 obtains an output not satisfying ( , δ)-DP. To the second protocol, either r 1 or r 2 equals LT(r 1 , r 2 ). Without loss of generality, assuming r 1 = LT(r 1 , r 2 ), P 1 can then compute the value of o − r 1 to obtain f (x 1 , x 2 ), which obviously violates DP. A similar protocol, which has the similar drawback as the second protocol, is used to achieve Laplace mechanism in [1] . Therefore, both of the two protocols in Example 1 do not inherit the ( , δ)-DP property of the function they compute. Example 2 (Laplace mechanism). The same as Example 1, P 1 , P 2 want to output f (x 1 , x 2 ). In this time, they use Laplace mechanism to achieve DP, i.e., adding Laplace noise to f (x 1 , x 2 ). By Definition 3 in Section II-B, they can add a random number r drawn from Lap(1/ ) to achieve -DP. They construct a protocol as follows: Each party P i generates two random numbers r i1 , r i2 drawn from N (0, 1/ √ 2 ) locally. The parties then use an MPC protocol to compute o = f (x 1 , x 2 ) + r and output o, where r ← i (r 2 i1 − r 2 i2 ). The above protocol is shown in [11] , [12] , [13] . However, we conclude that it does not inherit the -DP property of the function it computes. The reason is that P 1 can obtain the value of f (x 1 , x 2 ) + (r 2 21 − r 2 22 ) by subtracting (r 2 11 − r 2 12 ) from o, and that the distribution function of (r 2 21 − r 2 22 ) is not Lap(1/ ).
From Example 1 and Example 2 we see that it is difficult to construct a protocol that can inherit the differential privacy property of the function it computes. The crux of the difficulty is that differentially private function is a kind of randomized function, whose output is a random element drawn from a prescribed distribution function (please see Definition 1 in Section II-B), and that the result about computing randomized function in MPC is rare. In the paper we will develop some theoretical results about computing randomized function in the distributed setting and then treat the above inheritance problem. Note that differentially private function and random variable are two kinds of randomized function: with constant inputs for the second one.
A. Contribution
Our contributions are as follows. First, we provide a special security definition of computing randomized function in the distributed setting, in which a new notion obliviousness is introduced. Obliviousness captures the key security problems when computing a randomized function from a deterministic one. By this observation, we provide a sufficient and necessary condition (Theorem 2) about securely computing a randomized function from a deterministic one. The above result can not only be used to determine whether a protocol for computing a randomized function (and therefore a differentially private function) is secure, but also be used to construct a secure one. To the best of our knowledge, ours (Theorem 2) is the first to provide a sufficient and necessary condition about this problem.
Second, we prove that the differential privacy property of a function can be inherited by the protocol computing it if the protocol securely computes it (Theorem 3), i.e., the inheritance problem. We also provide the composition theorem of differential privacy in the distributed setting (Theorem 4). To the best of our knowledge, the paper is the first to provide these results in differential privacy.
Finally, we construct protocols of Gaussian mechanism and Laplace mechanism, which satisfy the obliviousness property and therefore inherit the differential privacy property.
II. PRELIMINARY

A. Secure Multiparty Computation Framework
MPC enables n parties P 1 , . . . , P n jointly evaluate a prescribed function on private inputs in a privacy-preserving way. We assume that the n parties are connected by perfectly secure channels in a synchronous network. We employ the (t, n)-Shamir's secret sharing scheme for representation of and secure computation on private values, where t is the threshold denoting that any set of s ≥ t + 1 parties can reconstruct the shared secret but can't for any s < t. By using the (t, n)-Shamir's secret sharing scheme the computation of a function f (·) can be divided into three stages. Stage I: Each party enters his input x i to the computation using Shamir's secret sharing. Stage II: The parties simulate the circuit computing f (x 1 , . . . , x n ), producing a new shared secret T whose value is f (x 1 , . . . , x n ). Stage III: At least t + 1 shares of f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) are sent to one party, who reconstructs it. All operations are assumed to be performed in a prime field F p . When treating fixed point and floating point number operations, we employ the corresponding protocols in [14] , [15] , [16] . By using these protocols we can treat the real number operations in a relatively precise way. Therefore, in the paper we assume there are some fundamental real number operations in MPC: addition, multiplication, division, comparison, exponentiation etc. For more formal and general presentation of this approach please see [17] , [18] .
B. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy of a dataset function means that any change in a single individual input may only induce a small change in the distribution on its outcomes. A differentially private function is a kind of randomized function.
Definition 2 (Differential Privacy [8] , [7] ). A randomized function M gives ( , δ)-differential privacy if for all datasets x and y differing on at most one element (called them neighbors), and all S ⊂ Range(M),
There are mainly two ways to achieve differential privacy: noise mechanism [8] and exponential mechanism [9] . Noise mechanism computes the desired function on the dataset and then adds appropriate noise to the output of the function.
Definition 3 ([7]
). Let k ≥ 1 be an integer and let Δ p f = max neighbors x,x f (x) − f (x ) p denote the p sensitivity of f . The Gaussian mechanism M(x, f ) generates a random (vector) value r = (r 1 , . . . , r k ), where each r i is independently drawn from N (f i (x), σ 2 ). The Laplace mechanism M(x, f ) generates a random (vector) value r = (r 1 , . . . , r k ), where each r i is independently drawn from Lap(f i (x), Δ 1 f/ ). If σ > 2 ln 1.25/δΔ 2 f/ , the Gaussian mechanism satisfies ( , δ)-differential privacy. The Laplace mechanism satisfiesdifferential privacy.
Any sequence of computations that each provides differential privacy in isolation also provide differential privacy in sequence.
Note that Lemma 1 is true not only when M 1 , . . . , M n are run independently, but even when subsequent computations can incorporate the outcomes of the preceding computations.
C. Notations
Throughout the paper, let [x] denote that the value x is secretly shared among the parties by using Shamir's secret sharing. We use capital letters to denote either a random variable (vector) or a set and use lowercase letter to denote a (vector) value of the corresponding random variable (vector). Let Y ∼ F denote the random variable (vector) Y follows the distribution function F . Let Lap(a, b) denotes the Laplace distribution with variance 2b 2 and mean a, and if a = 0 it is denoted as Lap(b).
III. THE SECURITY OF COMPUTING RANDOMIZED FUNCTION
In the section, we study the security of computing randomized function in the distributed setting. We focus on in what condition can the computation of a randomized function be reduced to a deterministic one. The results of the section are vital to construct differentially private protocols.
We first give the definition of (statistical) indistinguishability.
Definition 4 (Indistinguishability [4]). Two random vactors
The security definition of protocols for computing random- 
where s i drawn from F i is a random (vector) value P i inputs, and m j represents the j-th message it has received. The output of P i after an execution of π on (x, s), denoted OUTPUT π i (x, s), is implicit in the party's own view of the execution, and OUTPUT π (x, s) = (OUTPUT π 1 (x, s), . . . , OUTPUT π n (x, s)).
We say that π securely computes M if there exists an algorithm S, such that for every I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, it holds that
Throughout the paper, we assume that M 1 (x) = · · · = M n (x) and that OUTPUT π 1 (x, s) = · · · = OUTPUT π n (x, s). That is, each party obtains the same output.
We remark that the above definition is slightly different from Definition 7.5.1 in [4] that a private random vector value s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) is input during the execution of π. The role of s is to generate randomness in order to compute M(x) (since M(x) is a randomized function). We call s a seed to compute the randomized function M(x). By providing the seed s, Definition 5 try to capture the vital characteristic of the process of computing randomized functions in the distributed setting, such as Example 1 and Example 2.
We define the notion of private reduction and cite a corresponding composition theorem. The readers can refer to [4] , [20] for more details. 
where g is a deterministic function such that s = g(s), s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) and the random value s i is drawn from F i . That is, in the distributed setting, we reduce computing the randomized function M to computing the deterministic function f . In the section, we consider the security problem induced by the reduction. We now introduce the notion of obliviousness, which is important to securely reduce the computation of randomized function to deterministic one. Definition 7 (Obliviousness). With the notation denoted as Definition 5, let the seed s is any one addisible assignment of the random vector η. Then η is said to be oblivious to π if for every I = {i 1 , . . . , i k } ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, there is
Obliviousness, which is a (nontrivial) generalization of the notion "obliviously" in [21] , says that the seed (of each party or each proper subgroup of the parties) should be independent to the protocol's output. In other words, the execution of the protocol should be "oblivious" to the seed. One can verify that both the (not secure) two protocols in Example 1 to compute Gaussian mechanism and the (not secure) protocol in Example 2 to compute Laplace mechanism do not satisfy the property of obliviousness. Lemma 2. With the notation denoted as Definition 7, if η is not oblivious to π, then π can't securely compute M.
Proof. Assume that η is not oblivious to π. There then exist one I and one s I such that
Assume that, in executing π, the parties P I input the value s I for η I . For any simulator with input (x I , M I , F I ), who does not know η I = s I , it is unable to get the distribution function {OUTPUT π (x, η)|η I = s I } x . Therefore, there exist one I and one s I such that {OUTPUT π (x, η)|η I = s I } x is unable to be simulated by any simulator. However, the above distribution function is known to P I since they know η I = s I , which implies that (OUTPUT π (x, η)|η I = s I ) ∈ VIEW I (x, η). Therefore, (1) does not hold for I and η I = s I , for any simulator. Hence, π can't private compute M.
The claim is proved.
Lemma 2 gives a necessary condition to the security of protocol for computing randomized function. Therefore, in order to securely reducing the computation of a randomized function to deterministic one, the seed should not only be secret among the parties but also be oblivious to the protocol's output. In the following, we give it a sufficient condition. Lemma 3. Let M, s and f be defined as in (2) and let η be a random vector follows the distribution function from which s is drawn. Suppose that the following protocol, denoted π, is oblivious to η. Then it securely reduces M to f . Protocol 1: securely reducing a randomized function to a deterministic one input : P i gets x i output: Each party outputs the oracle's response 1 P i selects s i drawn from F i ; 2 P i invokes the oracle of f with query (x i , s i ), and records the oracle response.
Proof. Clearly, this protocol computes M. To show that π securely computes M, we need to present a simulator S I for each group of parties P I 's view. For notational simplicity, we only prove that there exists a simulator S i for each party P i . On input (x i , v i ), where x i is the local input to P i and v i is its local output, the simulator selects s i ∼ F i , and outputs (x i , s i , v i ). The main observation underlying the analysis of this simulator is that for every fixed x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and s , we have v = M(x, s ) if and only if v = f (x, s), for every s satisfying s = g(s). Now, let η i be a random variable representing the random choice of P i in Step 1, and η i denote the corresponding choice made by the simulator S i . Then, referring to (1), we show that for every fixed x, s i and v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ), it holds that
where the equalities are justified as follows: the 1st by the definition of π, the 2nd by the obliviousness of π to η and the definition of f , the 3rd by definition of η i and η i , the 4th by the independence of η and M, and the 5th by definition of S i . Thus, the simulated view (and output) is distributed identically to the view (and output) in a real execution.
Similarly, for each group of parties P I 's view, there exists a simulator S such that (1) holds.
The proof is complete.
We remark that the proof technique in Lemma 3 is borrowed from [4, Proposition 7.3.4] .
By combining Theorem 1, Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, we have the following theorem. Theorem 2 holds for differentially private functions since the later is a kind of randomized functions. Therefore, Theorem 2 gives a necessary and sufficient condition about how to securely compute differentially private functions. Furthermore, Theorem 2 can not only be used to determine whether a protocol computing differentially private function is secure, such as the protocols in Example 1 and Example 2, but also be used to construct secure one, such as those protocols in Section V.
IV. MULTIPARTY DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
For an ( , δ)-differentially private function and a protocol for computing it in the distributed setting, we are willing to see that the protocol has inherited the ( , δ)-differential privacy property of the function. It is intuitive that if the protocol securely computes the function it will inherit the property naturally. In the section, we will prove that this is the truth.
We first introduce the notion of differential privacy in the distributed setting, which says that the view of each party (or each subgroup of the parties) is differentially private in respect to other parties' inputs.
Definition 8 (Multiparty differential privacy [22] ). Let the notations be denoted as Definition 5. We say that two datasets x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) differ on at most one element if there exists i 0 such that x i = y i for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {i 0 } and that the two datasets x i0 , y i0 differ on at most one element. The protocol π is said to be ( , δ)-differentially private if for all datasets x, y differing on at most one element, for all S, and for all i 0 and I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n} \ {i 0 },
Theorem 3. Assume that M is an ( , δ)-differentially private function and that π is a protocol to securely compute M in the distributed setting. Then π is ( , δ)-differentially private.
Proof. For notational simplicity, we only prove the case of I ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. The general case can be treated similarly. We inherit the notations from Definition 8.
Since M(x) is ( , δ)-differentially private, we have
Then for all S and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {i 0 },
Therefore, by [7, Proposition 2.1], for all simulator S i and all domain S ,
On the other hand, since π(x) is a protocol to securely compute M(x), there exists a simulatorS i such that
Combining the last two formulas, we have
Moreover, since OUTPUT π i (x, s) is implicit in VIEW π i (x, s) (see Definition 5), the later can be seen as a post-processing of the former. Therefore, for all x,
By inputting the last equation into (5), we have (3).
The following theorem provides the sequential composition property to differentially private protocols.
Theorem 4 (Composition theorem). Assume that the protocol π i securely computes ( i , δ i )-differentially private function M i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Then their composition, defined to be π 1···k = (π 1 , . . . , π k ), is ( i i , i δ i )-differentially private.
Proof. Since each π i is secure to compute M i , then their combination π 1···k is secure to compute M 1···k by Theorem 1. By Theorem 3 and Lemma 1 we have π 1···k is ( i i , i δ i )differentially private.
Note that, by Lemma 1, Theorem 4 is true not only when π 1 , . . . , π k are run independently, but even when subsequent computations can incorporate the outcomes of the preceding computations.
V. GAUSSIAN MECHANISM AND LAPLACE MECHANISM
In this section, we use the results in Section III to construct secure protocols to implement Gaussian mechanism and Laplace mechanism. Importantly, the two protocols satisfy the property of obliviousness.
Recall that, let [x] denote the secretly shared value of x among the parties by using Shamir's secret sharing.
We first provide Protocol 2 to generate random variable X following the Bernoulli Bern(1/2) distribution, where X takes on only two values: 0 and 1, both with probability 1/2. Protocol 2 uses the fact that the XOR of two Bernoulli Bern(1/2) random variables is also a Bernoulli Bern(1/2) random variable. following Bern(1/2) 1 P i generates a random bit s i drawn from Bern(1/2) and
shares it among the parties, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n;
where ⊕ denote the XOR operation.
We give Protocol 3 to achieve Gaussian mechanism. The protocol approximates the Gaussian distribution N (0, σ 2 ) by using the central limit theorem [ The parties compute
The parties set
Protocol 4 provides the Laplace mechanism in the distributed setting.
Theorem 5. Let σ > 2 ln 1.25/δΔ 2 f/ . Then Protocol 3 satisfies ( , δ)-differential privacy. Protocol 4 satisfiesdifferential privacy.
Proof. We only proof correctness and obliviousness.
Correctness: In Protocol 3, Step 2 to Step 5 generate a random variable X j ∼ N(0, σ 2 ) by using the central limit theorem [10, Corollary 11.1.3 ]. Then f j (x) + X j ∼ N (f j (x), σ 2 ). In Protocol 4, Step 2 to Step 5 generate 4 The parties compute
random variables X 1j , . . . , X 4j ∼ N(0, Δf/2 ). Then X j ∼ Lap(f i (x), Δ 1 f/ ) by [11, Proposition 5.2] .
Obliviousness: The seeds needed in Protocol 3 and Protocol 4 are all input by invoking Protocol 2. On the other hand, it can be easily verified that Protocol 2 satisfies the property of obliviousness. Therefore, Protocol 3 and Protocol 4 inherit the obliviousness of Protocol 2.
VI. RELATED WORK Secure multiparty computation [15] , [14] , [20] , [4] studies how to securely compute functions in the distributed setting. The computation of randomized function, such as random variable generation, is seldom studied in MPC. Until recently, the development of DP in the distributed setting makes the study of the computation of randomized functions necessary in MPC. Except the works mentioned in Section I, other former works are presented as follows. Proposition 7.3.4 in [4] securely reduces computing randomized function to a deterministic one. However, it does not give criterion about what kind of seed, which is used to generate the randomness, is secure. That is, the criterion for how to determine a protocol computing a randomized function is secure is not given. Our conclusion gives a sufficient and necessary condition (Theorem 2) about it and therefore gives the criterion, i.e., obliviousness. Furthermore, obliviousness gives some clue on finding more (efficient) reduction protocols except the one in [4, Proposition 7.3.4] . Note also that the randomized functions the paper considers are confined to be n-ary functions having the same value for all components.
The notion of obliviousness can be seen as a (nontrivial) generation of the notion obliviously in [21] . However, they have one major difference: obliviously emphasises on the independence of the seed to the execution of the protocol computing the randomized function, where as obliviousness focus on the independence of the seed to the output of the protocol computing the deterministic function, to which the randomized function is securely reduced. The advantage of the later is that it separates the choosing of the seed from the execution of the protocol computing the deterministic function, which makes it easy to design and analyze the protocol for computing randomized function. [23] gives two protocols to generate Gaussian random variable and Laplace random variable in the distributed setting, which are used to compute differentially private summation functions. Although Protocol 3 in our paper is similar with the one in [23] to achieve Gaussian mechanism, our work focuses mainly on the fundamental theory and fundamental tools to compute randomized functions (and differentially private functions) in the distributed setting.
[16] presents a protocol to implement exponential mechanism, in which a sub-protocol is needed to generate uniform random variable following the uniform distribution U (0, 1). In order to generate such uniform random variable, the parties first secretly generate a uniform (γ + 1)-bit integer using the protocol RandInt(γ + 1). Then this integer is considered to be fractional part of fixed point number, whose integer part is 0. Afterwards, the fixed point number is converted to floating point by a secure protocol, which is output as the final result. The above protocol to generate uniform random number has two drawbacks. First, the invoked protocol RandInt(γ + 1), borrowed from [24] , [25] , generates a uniform random element in Z p by the modular sum of the uniform random elements in Z p generated by each of the parties. Note that the modular sum of two uniform random elements in Z p is, in general, not a uniform random elements in Z p [21] . Therefore, RandInt(γ + 1) (most probably) generates a non-uniform random (γ + 1)bit integer, which in turn leads to the non-uniformity of the one in [16] . Second, since γ is predetermined, the random number generated may not get value from many sub-intervals of [0, 1], such as the sub-interval (0, 2 −γ−1 ). Therefore, strictly speaking, the above method may not generate a random number with range [0, 1]. Of course, the uniform property in the range [0, 1] of the generated random number will be not satisfied. However, using the results in Section III, we can generate protocols for securely computing exponential mechanism [26] . [22] , [27] study the accuracy difference in computing Boolean functions between the client-server setting and the distributed setting. [28] introduces the notion of computational differential privacy in the two-party setting. [5] studies the influence to the accuracy of computing binary sum, gap threshold etc., when both of differentially private analyses and the construction of protocol are considered simultaneously, which is contrary to the paradigm we use in which we first analyze a problem using differentially private algorithm and then construct corresponding protocol to compute it.
Differential privacy is a rigorous and promising privacy definition. Much works have been done in differentially private data analyses [29] , [30] , [31] , [32] , [33] , [34] , [35] , [36] , [37] . Our work tries to extend these algorithms to the distributed setting. It constructs fundamental theory, such as Theorem 3 and Theorem 4, and fundamental tools, such as the protocols in Section V, about it.
Non-uniform Random variable generation [38] is a well developed field in computer science and statistics. It studies how to generate non-uniform random variables following the prescribed distribution function. The results in Section III can be used to generate secure random variables in the distributed setting, such as in Section V. The traditional random variable generation algorithms can be redesigned to construct protocols to adapt to the distributed setting.
VII. CONCLUSION
The paper tries to answer in what condition can a protocol inherit the differential privacy property of a function it computes and how to construct such protocol. We prove that the differential privacy property of a function can be inherited by the protocol computing it if the protocol securely computes it. Then a theorem provides the sufficient and necessary condition of securely computing a randomized function (and so differentially private function) from a deterministic one. The last result can not only be used to determine whether a protocol computing differentially private function is secure, but also be used to construct a secure one. In obtaining these results, the notion obliviousness plays a vital role, which captures the key security problems when computing a randomized function from a deterministic one in the distributed setting. However, we can't prove the assertion that a protocol can't inherit the differential privacy property of the function it computes if the protocol does not satisfy obliviousness. We tend to give a negative answer to the problem.
The theoretical results in Section III and Section IV is fundamental to multiparty differential privacy. They can be used to construct fundamental differentially private protocols, such as protocols for Gaussian mechanism, Laplace mechanism and Exponential mechanism. By using these fundamental protocols, differentially private protocols for many complex problems, such as the empirical risk minimization problem [32] , can be constructed with little effort. Due to page limit, we does not present these results in the paper. Interested reader can see the full paper [26] .
